Author: Lou Williams | Published: 23/12/2025

Series: Decision-Making

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic provided a critical stress test for systems of governance, particularly in relation to how ministers engage with evidence under conditions of uncertainty, urgency, and high political risk. In the UK, the pandemic exposed the complexity of the relationship between policymakers and scientific advisers, the role of data in decision-making, and the communicative strategies used to justify far-reaching policy interventions. As Francoise et al. observe, the pandemic not only underlined the importance of evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) in public health, but also revealed the tensions that arise when scientific uncertainty collides with political responsibility. [i]

Throughout the crisis, UK ministers repeatedly claimed to be “following the science”, presenting pandemic policy as the logical output of expert advice. Yet the scale, speed, and consequences of decisions taken during COVID-19 suggest that evidence alone could not determine outcomes. This article examines how evidence was used, interpreted, and communicated during the UK’s COVID-19 response, focusing primarily on decision-making at Westminster while drawing on comparative insights from the devolved context. It argues that crisis governance compressed decision-making, intensified centralisation, and elevated political judgement, with evidence often functioning as a legitimising narrative rather than a neutral guide to action.

Evidence-Based Policymaking Under Conditions of Uncertainty

Theories of EBPM generally assume that policymakers are able to engage with evidence in relatively stable environments, where information can be gathered, assessed, and weighed against policy objectives. [ii] COVID-19 disrupted these assumptions. The pandemic was not a conventional policy problem but a rapidly evolving public health emergency, characterised by incomplete data, contested models, and limited time for deliberation.

Cairney highlights the cognitive limits faced by policymakers, particularly in unpredictable environments where attention, time, and information-processing capacity are constrained. [ii] These limits were acutely visible during the pandemic. Scientific evidence was provisional and often contradictory, with estimates of transmission rates, fatality, and behavioural responses changing as new data emerged. Matsuda and Yoshimura’s systematic review of EBPM during COVID-19 demonstrates how evidence use varied across different phases of the pandemic, reflecting shifts in uncertainty rather than a linear accumulation of knowledge. [iii]

The pandemic therefore challenged the idea of a stable evidence base. Rather than providing clear policy prescriptions, scientific advice often highlighted ranges of risk and conditional outcomes. As Williams et al. note, policymakers were required to navigate a blurred boundary between science, policy, and politics, with evidence competing against economic and social considerations. [iv]

Lockdown Decision-Making and the Limits of Evidence

The decision to impose a nationwide lockdown in March 2020 illustrates how evidence operated under crisis conditions. Following the detection of initial cases in January 2020, the UK government convened SAGE as its primary scientific advisory mechanism. [v] SAGE provided modelling and epidemiological advice, while senior figures such as the Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific Adviser acted as direct advisers to ministers.

However, as Cairney notes, SAGE minutes in the period leading up to the lockdown contained little indication that a nationwide lockdown was imminent until shortly before the decision was taken. [vi] The shift towards lockdown occurred rapidly, influenced by escalating case numbers, concerns about NHS capacity, and international experiences, particularly in Italy. Critics have argued that early modelling underestimated transmission rates and case doubling times, contributing to delays in intervention.

This episode highlights the vulnerability of decision-making to evidential uncertainty. Ministers were required to act on imperfect models while recognising the significant social and economic costs of lockdown. As Williams et al. observe, lockdown measures directly conflicted with economic objectives and educational continuity, forcing policymakers to weigh competing forms of expert evidence. [iv] Parkhurst’s discussion of evidence hierarchies is instructive here: evidence does not speak for itself, but must be judged for relevance, applicability, and appropriateness within a specific context. [vii]

Under such conditions, traditional EBPM frameworks lose traction. The urgency of the pandemic limited opportunities for systematic evaluation, placing greater emphasis on political judgement exercised under severe time pressure.

Political Judgement, Ideology, and Centralisation

The necessity of political judgement became increasingly apparent as the pandemic progressed. Faced with trade-offs between public health protection and economic stability, ministers were required to make decisions that reflected normative values as well as empirical assessments. Williams et al. suggest that right-leaning governments may be more inclined to prioritise economic activity and individual freedom, [iv] a dynamic that was visible in internal Conservative Party debates over lockdown measures.

These ideological considerations help to explain divergence within the UK’s multi-level governance system. Sargeant documents how differing political priorities between the UK government and devolved administrations contributed to variation in restrictions and public messaging. [viii] While scientific advice was broadly shared, political interpretation of that advice varied, reinforcing the argument that evidence does not dictate policy outcomes in isolation.

Crisis governance also intensified centralisation. Emergency powers and rapid policy cycles concentrated authority within the UK government, reducing the scope for parliamentary scrutiny and intergovernmental coordination. While centralisation enabled swift action, it also limited institutional challenge and reinforced executive dominance over crisis response.

“Following the Science” and the Politics of Depoliticisation

Throughout the pandemic, the UK government’s repeated assertion that it was “guided by the science” functioned as a central communicative strategy. [v] This framing aimed to present policy decisions as objective and technocratic, distancing ministers from responsibility for controversial measures.

Kettell and Kerr argue that appeals to science during COVID-19 were used to depoliticise decision-making, particularly during periods of high mortality and uncertainty. [ix] By framing choices as evidence-driven, ministers could deflect blame for adverse outcomes onto the limits of scientific knowledge. This strategy aligns with Hood’s theory of blame avoidance, in which political actors seek to manage responsibility under conditions of risk. [x]

However, as Stevens contends, governments cannot simply “follow the science” during a rapidly evolving pandemic. [xi] Scientific consensus was limited, and international responses varied significantly, reflecting political choices rather than purely scientific differences. The UK government’s reliance on scientific rhetoric therefore masked the inherently political nature of pandemic governance.

When indicators improved, the communicative strategy shifted. Kettell and Kerr note that ministers were more willing to claim credit for positive outcomes, [ix] illustrating an oscillation between depoliticisation and politicisation depending on circumstances.

Evidence, Narratives, and Communication

The pandemic demonstrated that evidence alone is insufficient without effective communication. Daily press briefings became a core feature of the UK’s response, combining political leadership with scientific authority. Data visualisations were used extensively to convey urgency and justify policy measures.

Allen et al. analyse the politics of visualisation during COVID-19 briefings, showing how charts and graphs functioned as alignment devices, orienting policymakers, media, and the public towards shared interpretations of risk. [xii] These visual tools helped translate complex data into accessible narratives, reinforcing the government’s claim to evidence-based action.

The presence of scientific advisers alongside ministers further enhanced credibility. [xiii] However, the simplification of data risked obscuring uncertainty, creating an impression of precision that scientific evidence could not always support. Moreover, the cognitive burden placed on policymakers was substantial. Cairney emphasises that evidence can only influence policy if decision-makers are able to understand and process it, a condition not always met under crisis pressures. [ii] Testimony from the UK COVID-19 Inquiry suggests that even senior ministers struggled to grasp aspects of the evidence presented to them.

Implications for Crisis Governance

The UK’s COVID-19 response illustrates how EBPM operates differently under crisis conditions. Evidence informed decisions, but it did not determine them. Instead, evidence was filtered through political judgement, institutional incentives, and communicative strategies aimed at maintaining legitimacy.

Crisis governance compresses time, centralises authority, and increases reliance on narratives to justify action. In this environment, claims of “following the science” function less as accurate descriptions of process and more as tools of governance. Recognising this dynamic is essential for institutional learning and future crisis preparedness.

As Francoise et al. argue, effective crisis policymaking requires trust between policymakers, scientists, and citizens, as well as transparency about uncertainty. [i] Overstating the determinative power of science risks undermining public trust when guidance changes or outcomes worsen.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic did not demonstrate a failure of evidence-based policymaking, but it exposed the limits of evidence under extreme conditions. The UK government’s response reveals how evidence, politics, and communication intersect during crises, shaping decisions in ways that cannot be captured by technocratic models alone.

Understanding crisis governance requires moving beyond simplistic narratives of “following the science” and acknowledging the role of political judgement, centralisation, and strategic communication. COVID-19 offers enduring lessons about the realities of governing under pressure, and the need for more honest frameworks to assess how decisions are made when certainty is unavailable.

[i] Francoise, M., et al, (2022) Evidence based policy making during times of uncertainty through the lens of future policy makers: four recommendations to harmonise and guide health policy making in the future, Archives of Public Health, 80, Article no. 140, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13690-022-00898-z

[ii] Cairney, P. (2016). The Science of Policymaking. In: The Politics of Evidence-Based Policy Making. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51781-4_1

[iii] Matsuda, S. & Yoshimura, H. (2023). Evidence-Based Policy Making during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic: A Systematic Review. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2023 Apr;38(2):247- 251. doi: 10.1017/S1049023X23000262. Epub 2023 Mar 6. PMID: 36872569.

[iv] Williams, G., et al (2020). Translating Evidence Into Policy During the Covid-19 Pandemic: Bridging Science and Policy (and Politics), Eurohealth, available at: https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/336293/Eurohealth-26-2-29-33-eng.pdf

[v] Atkinson, P., et al. (2022). How did UK policymaking in the COVID-19 response use science? Evidence from scientific advisers. Evidence & Policy, 18(4), 633-650. Retrieved Jan 16, 2024, from https://doi.org/10.1332/174426421X16388976414615

[vi] Cairney, P. (2020). The UK government’s COVID-19 policy: assessing evidence-informed policy analysis in real time. Br Polit 16, 90–116 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-020- 00150-8

[vii] Parkhurst, J. (2016). The politics of evidence: form evidence-based policy to the good governance of evidence. Routledge Studies in Governance and Public Policy. Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon.

[viii] Sargeant, J. (2020). Coordination and Divergence: Devolution and Coronavirus, Institute for Government, available at: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/report/coordination-anddivergence-devolution-and-coronavirus

[ix] Kettell, S. & Kerr, P. (2022). ‘Guided by the science’: (De)politicising the UK government’s response to the coronavirus crisis. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 24(1), 11-30. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211054957

[x] Hood, C. (2011). The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government. Princeton University Press, 2011. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7tc57. Accessed 23 Dec. 2025.

[xi] Stevens, A. (2020). Governments cannot just ‘follow the science’ on COVID-19. Nat Hum Behav 4, 560 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0894-x

[xii] Allen, W., et al. (2023). 'Next slide please: The politics of visualization during COVID-19 press briefings', Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2160784

[xiii] Cairney, P. (2021). The UK Government’s COVID-19 Policy: What Does “Guided by the Science” Mean in Practice?, Frontiers in Political Science, vol 3, DOI=10.3389/fpos.2021.624068